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Baumrind: Protecting Online Anonymity and Preserving Reputation Through Due

PROTECTING ONLINE ANONYMITY AND
PRESERVING REPUTATION
THROUGH DUE PROCESS
Michael R. Baumrind ∗
INTRODUCTION
In August of 2008, a blogger 1 angered cover model Liskula Cohen
by calling her, among other names, a “skank,” 2 an “old hag,” 3 and a
“ho” 4 through the website Blogger.com. 5 Asserting that these
comments were “malicious and untrue,” 6 Cohen, in turn, wanted to
use New York’s defamation laws to seek redress from the blogger. 7
At first glance, Cohen had everything she needed to at least file such
a claim. 8 The statements were clearly published and likely without
permission. 9 They were arguably false—Cohen would likely dispute
that she is “sexually promiscuous” 10 or a “prostitute.” 11 The one thing
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. Special thanks to Professor
Jonathan Todres for his mentorship and advice and to my husband Henry for his love and support.
1. A blog, short for weblog, is a “website that displays in chronological order the postings by one or
more individuals and usu[ally] has links to comments on specific postings.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1554 (4th ed. 2007). A blogger is one who “write[s] entries in, add[s] material
to, or maintain[s] a weblog.” Id. at 155.
2. Maureen Dowd, Stung by the Perfect Sting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at A23, available at
2009 WLNR 16617973.
3. Id.
4. Id.; Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425–26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
5. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425–26.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. “The elements of a cause of action for defamation ‘are a false statement, published without
privilege or authorization to a third-party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence
standard, and, it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se.’” Id. at 427–28 (quoting
Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)).
9. See Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425–26. Cohen’s complaint alleged that the statements were
published on the online website Blogger.com. Id.
10. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428. The Cohen court defines “skank” as “‘one who is disgustingly foul
or filthy and often considered sexually promiscuous.’” Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1297 (4th ed. 2009), available at
http://www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/skank).
11. Id. The anonymous blogger allegedly called Cohen a “ho,” which the court defines as “‘slang’
for a ‘prostitute.’” Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 658
(4th ed. 2009), available at http://www.dictionaryreference.com/browse/ho).
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she did not have, however, was the anonymous blogger’s identity. 12
Rather than ending her suit before it even began, Cohen did what a
growing number of defamation plaintiffs do: 13 she sought a court
order compelling the Internet Service Provider (ISP) 14 to release the
anonymous blogger’s identity. 15
Eventually, the First Amendment could pose a problem for Cohen.
She is a public figure, and the Supreme Court has held the First
Amendment vigorously protects one’s right to speak out against those
in the public eye. 16 Unlike her private-plaintiff counterparts, during
discovery Cohen will have to produce evidence to support that the
alleged defamatory statements were false and that the defendant
published them with “actual malice.” 17 At this pre-action, prediscovery stage of litigation, however, Cohen is not trying to prevail
on her cause of action; she is trying to bring it in the first place. To do
so, she needs to know whom to sue, and in some courts, this
implicates another First Amendment concern: the right to
anonymity. 18
The Supreme Court has protected the right to anonymity in four
seminal cases. 19 In each of these four cases, the Court invalidated
12. Id. at 425.
13. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966
A.2d 432, 434–38 (Ct. App. Md. 2009); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001); Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S. 2d 695, 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); Lassa v.
Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 679 (Wis. 2006).
14. An Internet Service Provider is an “organization that provides access to the Internet.” PC
Mag.com
Encyclopedia,
Definition
of
ISP,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=ISP&i=45481,00.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). In
Cohen, Google, the parent company of Blogger.com was the ISP holding the identity of the anonymous
blogger. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425. For a helpful discussion of the relationships among blogs, ISPs,
email addresses, and identity, see Indep. Newspapers, Inc., 966 A.2d at 435–38.
15. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
16. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (“The constitutional guarantees require, we
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”).
17. Id. at 280.
18. See generally Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Disclosure in Cyberspace,
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 888–904 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court has protected a right to anonymous speech
in some circumstances. Infra Part II.
19. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley v.
Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/12

2

Baumrind: Protecting Online Anonymity and Preserving Reputation Through Due

2011]

PROTECTING ONLINE ANONYMITY

759

laws requiring a speaker to identify himself prior to speaking. 20 Now,
when anonymous online speech threatens an individual’s reputation,
trial courts have begun asking whether compelling disclosure of an
online speaker’s identity would violate this right. 21
In Doe v. Cahill, 22 the Delaware Supreme Court articulated
several concerns in this context:
The possibility of losing anonymity in a future lawsuit could
intimidate anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments
or simply not commenting at all. A defamation plaintiff,
particularly a public figure, obtains a very important form of
relief by unmasking the identity of his anonymous critics. The
revelation of identity of an anonymous speaker “may subject [the
speaker] to ostracism for expressing unpopular ideas, invite
retaliation from those who oppose her ideas or from those whom
she criticizes, or simply give unwanted exposure to her mental
processes.” 23

Based on these concerns, Cahill required that a plaintiff seeking to
compel disclosure satisfy a heightened “summary judgment” standard
before clearing this First Amendment hurdle. 24 This means that the
plaintiff must not only state facts but also “introduce evidence
creating a genuine issue of material fact for all elements of a
defamation claim.” 25
In contrast to Cahill, the New York case of Cohen v. Google, Inc.
relegated these First Amendment concerns to a footnote and

20. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 168–69; Buckley, 525 U.S. at 204; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Talley,
362 U.S. at 65–66; see also infra Part II.
21. See infra Part I.
22. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
23. Id. at 457 (alteration in original) (quoting Lidsky, supra note 18, at 890).
24. Id.; see also Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Cahill, 884 A.2d at
460; Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009); Reunion Indus., Inc. v. Doe, 80 Pa. D.
& C.4th 449, 452 (C.P. Penn. 2007).
25. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463. In Cahill, the Court acknowledged that certain elements of a defamation
claim, such as “actual malice,” are nearly impossible to support with evidence at this early stage of
litigation, and therefore the defamation plaintiff need only introduce evidence on material facts within
her control. Id. at 463–64; accord Solers, 977 A.2d at 954.
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summarily dismissed them. 26 New York trial courts have consistently
held that the generally applicable rules for pre-action discovery, 27
combined with the elements of a defamation suit, “appear to address
the constitutional concerns.” 28 Therefore, in New York, a plaintiff
may be able to compel disclosure by merely showing a prima facie
basis for a “meritorious cause of action and that the information
sought is material and necessary to the actionable wrong.” 29 For
Cohen, this meant she needed only to state facts that “fairly
indicate[d] [s]he ha[d] some cause of action against the adverse
party.” 30 She did not need to produce actual evidence of
defamation. 31
Currently, there is little consensus on how to approach this issue.32
This Note begins in Part I by describing the varying approaches
courts take when addressing whether to grant a subpoena for an
anonymous blogger’s identity in a defamation suit. Part I reveals that
similar cases are handled inconsistently.
Part II demonstrates that until recently, the Supreme Court had not
made clear whether a constitutional right to anonymous speech truly
exists. Part II.A first considers the extent to which the U.S. Supreme
Court seems to have recognized a constitutional right to anonymous
speech in four cases: Talley v. California, 33 McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, 34 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, 35 and Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York
v. Village of Stratton.36 Based on these four cases, Part II.A
recognizes that only in certain circumstances is anonymity deserving
of heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Part II.B then addresses
26. See Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 n.5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
27. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102 (McKinney 2005).
28. Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 427 n.5 (listing cases relying on New York’s generally applicable preaction disclosure rule and showing that many refuse to compel identity disclosure under this rule).
29. Id. at 426–27 (quoting Uddin v. New York City Transit Auth., 810 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (App. Div.
2006)).
30. Stewart v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 163 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
31. See Cohen, 887 N.Y.S.2d at 428–29.
32. See infra Part I.
33. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
34. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
35. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
36. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc., 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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Doe v. Reed, decided in the summer of 2010. 37 In this case, the
Supreme Court explained that when disclosure laws burden a
fundamental right, such as the right to political speech, the proper
level of review is known as exacting scrutiny. 38 Part II concludes by
suggesting that, when no such right is implicated, the level of
scrutiny is much lower.
Part III then brings these cases to bear on the issue of whether to
compel an anonymous blogger’s identity in an online defamation suit.
Part III begins by viewing anonymity through a due process lens.
After briefly defining procedural and substantive due process in Part
III.A, Part III.B urges that the same concerns central to the four
anonymous speech cases should drive the decision whether to compel
disclosure. Part III.B concludes by demonstrating how courts can,
and often do, apply due process on motions to compel disclosure of
the identity of an anonymous speaker in a defamation suit. Rather
than establishing a “different set of procedural rules for this single
class of cases,” 39 as many courts have inconsistently done, 40 courts
should universally employ due process. 41
I. LEGAL TOOLS PROTECTING IDENTITY IN
ONLINE DEFAMATION SUITS
Courts are far from a consensus on how to properly balance one’s
right to anonymously speak online with another’s right to protect her
reputation. 42 They differ primarily in the types of legal tools they
employ when deciding whether to compel disclosure. 43 These tools
include the procedural due process requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard, pleading and evidentiary requirements, and a
balancing test.
37. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
38. Id. at 2818.
39. Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive HandWringing Over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 855 (2004).
40. See infra Part I.
41. See infra Part III.
42. See infra Part I.
43. See infra Part I.
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A. Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard
Courts may disagree on how strong an online defamation suit must
be before compelling identity disclosure, but “even the most
lax . . . require[], at a minimum, that the anonymous Internet speaker
receive notice that his identity is the subject of a discovery request so
that he may have the opportunity to challenge the subpoena in
court.” 44 This requirement addresses one obvious concern: whether
the ISP has much of an incentive to zealously advocate for the
anonymity of its client. 45 “An ISP's primary interest is in minimizing
cost and maximizing profit, not in protecting anonymous speech or
preventing the defamation of a company.” 46 In Cohen, for example,
Google presented “no substantive opposition” 47 to a petition to
compel disclosure of the blogger’s identity. 48
This requirement of notice varies according to the circumstances.
In many cases, the ISP will notify its client directly. For example, in
the New York case of Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 49 Google, the ISP,
agreed to notify an anonymous blogger of the petition to divulge the
blogger’s identity. 50 In other cases, the court requires that the plaintiff
notify the defendant. 51 In Doe v. Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court
required that “to the extent reasonably practicable under the
circumstances, the plaintiff must undertake efforts to notify the
44. Anthony Ciolli, Repression of the Organic Internet: Three Problems, Three Solutions, 30 U. LA
VERNE L. REV. 370, 378 (2009). For case examples see Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2007); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005); and Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d
756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
45. See, e.g., Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S. 2d 695, 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (“‘[ISP]
Google leaves it to those people to come in and protect their own interests.’ . . . It is thus clear that
Google does not represent the interests of the people who anonymously operate blogs or anonymously
make comments on blogs maintained on Google’s website.” (citation omitted)).
46. Orit Goldring and Antonia L. Hamblin, Note, Think Before You Click: Online Anonymity Does
Not Make Defamation Legal, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 383, 396 (2003); see also David Sobel, The
Process That “John Doe” is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 3, 18–19 (2000).
47. Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
48. As the court explained, “Google merely object[ed] that petitioner’s request for relief [was]
overbroad, vague, and ambiguously worded, and unduly burdensome.” Id. at 425 n.1. However, once
notified, the anonymous blogger herself argued for heightened review on First Amendment grounds. Id.
at 427 n.5.
49. Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S.2d 695.
50. Id. at 697. In addition, the court issued an order to the same effect. Id. at 697–98.
51. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005).
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anonymous poster that he is the subject of a subpoena or application
for order of disclosure.” 52 This may include posting an online
message on the same website where the defendant allegedly posted
defamatory statements. 53 Finally, courts often stay proceedings “to
afford the anonymous defendant a reasonable opportunity to file and
serve opposition to the discovery request.” 54 Though they vary in
approach, all courts require some degree of notice and an opportunity
to be heard. 55
B. Plaintiff’s Pleadings and Evidence
One major point of diversion among courts is what standard to
apply when determining whether a plaintiff has adequately presented
a defamation suit against an anonymous speaker. 56 How strong of a
case must the plaintiff have, and how can courts measure this
strength? The Cahill court found it helpful to view this diversion as a
spectrum. 57 At the low end of the spectrum is the oft-rebuked 58 “good
faith standard,” 59 followed by the requirement of specificity in the
pleadings 60 or sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. 61 The
52. Id. at 460.
53. Id.; accord Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(requiring defamation plaintiff to “post[] a message of notification of the identity discovery request to
the anonymous user on the ISP’s pertinent message board”).
54. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
56. See Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255 (D. Conn. 2008) (“[T]he Court must consider
whether the plaintiffs have made an adequate showing as to their claims against the anonymous
defendant.”); infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
57. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
58. See, e.g., Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 241 (Ct. App. Ca. 2008) (“[The good faith
standard] offers no practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good faith and leaves the speaker
with little protection.”); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (reasoning the good faith standard is inadequate in part
because “[p]laintiffs can often initially plead sufficient facts to meet the good faith test . . . even if the
defamation claim is not very strong, or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation action to a
final decision”); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 952 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he ‘good faith test’
insufficiently protects a defendant’s anonymity.”); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432,
456 (Ct. App. Md. 2009) (rejecting good faith standard).
59. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d
377 (Va. 2001).
60. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“The
court shall also require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by
each anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech.”).
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spectrum tops off with a requirement that the plaintiff proffer the
prima facie evidence sufficient to survive a summary judgment
motion. 62
Viewing these standards as a spectrum, however, may be
misleading. Though the good faith standard seems easy to overcome,
a court must still be convinced of the possibility of a meritorious
cause of action. 63 This is not that different from requiring that a
plaintiff show she could survive a motion to dismiss. 64 A court could
hardly find a possible meritorious cause of action if the complaint, on
its face, fails to state a claim. 65 Finally, the motion to dismiss
standard naturally varies by jurisdiction, 66 with some requiring
particularity in the pleadings 67 and others merely requiring notice of
the cause of action. 68 Rather than looking at these standards as a
spectrum, they should be viewed in light of the core question: what
must the plaintiff show to convince the court that she has a
meritorious cause of action that warrants the stripping of one’s
anonymity?
1. Good Faith v. Motion to Dismiss: Which Standard is More
Rigorous?
In one of the first cases to broach the issue, a Virginia court
applied a good faith standard to its decision that would, in effect, strip
an Internet poster of his anonymity. 69 In In re Subpoena Duces
61. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 686–87 (Wis. 2006) (“On a motion to dismiss, the court
must determine whether a communication is ‘capable of a defamatory meaning.’” (quoting Starobin v.
Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 287 N.W.2d 747 (Wisc. 1980))).
62. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462–63.
63. See, e.g., America Online, 52 Va. Cir. at 37.
64. Generally, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege all facts necessary to support a
cognizable claim. 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pleading § 586 (1999).
65. See, e.g., America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 at 37.
66. Id. at 36 (“What is sufficient to plead a prima facie case varies from state to state and,
sometimes, from court to court.”).
67. See, e.g., Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006) (citing WIS. STAT § 802.03(6)
(1994) (requiring particularity when pleading defamation in Wisconsin)).
68. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005) (“Delaware is a notice pleading jurisdiction.
Thus, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it need only give ‘general notice of the claim
asserted.’” (quoting Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998))).
69. See America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 at 37.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/12

8

Baumrind: Protecting Online Anonymity and Preserving Reputation Through Due

2011]

PROTECTING ONLINE ANONYMITY

765

Tecum to America Online, Inc, America Online refused to divulge the
identity of an anonymous chatroom 70 participant who was potentially
subject to a defamation suit. 71 The court considered requiring a prima
facie showing of a valid defamation claim, but was uncomfortable
with the fact that “a prima facie case varies from state to state and,
sometimes, from court to court.” 72 Instead, this appellate court
attempted to provide more adequate protections of the First
Amendment right to anonymity. The court held that before
compelling identity disclosure, it must be “satisfied by the pleadings
or evidence . . . that the party requesting the subpoena has a
legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of
conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit was filed.” 73 A court
thus has discretion under this standard to determine “that a true,
rather than perceived, cause of action may exist.” 74
At first glance, it seems accurate to place this good faith standard
of America Online at the bottom of a spectrum outlined by Cahill.75
Under a good faith standard, there is no explicit requirement that a
plaintiff plead her case with particularity before a court will compel
identity disclosure. 76 As Cahill explains, “[p]laintiffs can often
initially plead sufficient facts to meet the good faith test . . . even if
the defamation claim is not very strong, or worse, if they do not
intend to pursue the defamation action to a final decision.”77

70. The court in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 (Md. 2009), provides a
helpful description of chatrooms: “A chatroom is another form of real-time communication over the
Internet and constitutes a website that is set up to handle a group discussion.” Id. at 438 (footnote
omitted).
71. America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 at 27–28. The ISP America Online was faced with a subpoena
duces tecum requiring that it divulge the anonymous chat room participant’s identity and moved for a
motion to quash that subpoena. Id.
72. Id. at 36. This issue was likely at the forefront of the judges’ minds because the original
defamation suit was filed in Indiana, but discovery was sought in Virginia. Id. at 27.
73. Id. at 37.
74. Id. at 36.
75. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
76. Id.
77. Id. In contrast, in Lassa v. Rongstad, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted a motion to
dismiss standard, in part because Wisconsin “require[s] particularity in the pleading of defamation
claims.” 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006). For Lassa, this meant the plaintiff had to allege specific
statements that were “capable of a defamatory meaning.” Id. But see Cahill, 884 A.2d 458 (refusing to
adopt a motion to dismiss standard because Delaware, as a notice pleading jurisdiction, only requires
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Requiring the plaintiff plead with particularity, on the other hand, is
one way to ensure that the plaintiff is not merely trying to discover
the speaker’s identity so she can ostracize, retaliate, or harass the
speaker. 78
However, upon closer inspection, the good faith standard of
America Online can actually be more rigorous. Compare the good
faith standard to a typical motion to dismiss, where the court looks
only to the pleadings. 79 The court in Cohen essentially applied a
motion to dismiss standard. 80 There, the court held that New York’s
generally applicable pre-action disclosure law requiring “a strong
showing that a cause of action exists,”81 combined with the law of
defamation, adequately addresses First Amendment concerns. 82 In
both Cohen and America Online “the adequacy of merit rest[ed]
within the sound discretion of the court.” 83 However, in Cohen, the
court relied solely on the facts as alleged and required no additional
production of evidence. 84 In contrast, the America Online court,
applying its good faith standard, required the plaintiff to go beyond
the complaint and actually “produce the subject Internet postings, so
that the court could better determine whether there is, in fact, a good
faith basis.” 85 It is clear that the label, good faith or motion to
that plaintiff “give ‘general notice of the claim asserted’” (quoting Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029,
1034 (Del. 1998))).
78. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (citing Lidsky, supra note 18 at 890).
79. See Rocker Mgmt. LLC v. John Does, No. MISC 03-003 3 CRB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16277,
at *3, 8 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2003) (applying a motion to dismiss standard and granting anonymous
blogger’s motion to quash a subpoena for his identity finding plaintiff failed to allege specific statements
with a defamatory meaning). But see Columbia Ins. Co. v. SeesCandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579–80
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (purportedly applying a motion to dismiss standard but also requiring plaintiff to
“make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability actually occurred” and looking beyond the
pleadings to the production of evidence to make its determination).
80. See Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
81. Id. (quoting Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of NY, 7B,
CPLR 3102:5, 92).
82. Id. at 426–27 n.5.
83. Id. at 427 (quoting Matters of Peters v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 821 N.Y.S.2d 61, 66 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006)).
84. Id.; accord Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (denying
plaintiff’s request for identity disclosure of anonymous speakers finding that, based on the facts as
alleged, plaintiff failed to demonstrate she had a meritorious cause of action).
85. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d
377 (Va. 2001).
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dismiss, does not in itself signify a level of review of a plaintiff’s
claim. 86
2. Should Plaintiffs Present Actual Evidence Beyond Their
Pleadings?
Regardless of the procedural label, many courts are more
comfortable depriving a speaker of his anonymity when the plaintiff
produces actual evidence of defamation. 87 As explained above, when
applying a good faith standard, the America Online court required the
production of evidence. 88 Similarly, in Columbia Insurance Company
v. Seescandy.com, 89 a California federal court purportedly applied a
motion to dismiss standard but, looking to outside evidence, required
a showing of actual defamation. 90 However, as seen in Cohen, not all
courts require evidence beyond the pleadings, 91 thus inviting the
question: Should courts require extrinsic evidence? Several courts
answer this question affirmatively.
In Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 92 Dendrite, a Delaware
corporation, filed a complaint against several fictitiously-named
defendants arguing, among other things, that their comments on a
Yahoo! bulletin board constituted defamation. 93 A New Jersey
intermediate appeals court denied Dendrite’s request to compel

86. See Vogel, supra note 48, at 857 (arguing that establishing a standard is potentially confusing);
see also Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009) (“Procedural labels such as prima facie or
‘summary judgment’ may prove misleading . . . .”); Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v.
JPA Dev., Inc., No. 0425 MARCH TERM 2004, 2006 WL 37020, at *8–9 (Pa.Com.Pl. Jan. 4, 2006)
(rejecting the establishment of new standards or labels for compelling identity disclosure and instead
relying on generally applicable rules of evidence).
87. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 462–63 (Del. 2005) (quoting AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt.,
LLC v. Cirrus Indus., 871 A.2d 428, 444 (Del. 2005)); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). But see Klehr, 2006 WL 37020, at *8–10 (relying on Pennsylvania’s
generally applicable Rule of Evidence 4011 which requires a good faith basis for discovery requests and
holding that plaintiff overcame this burden and thus was entitled to the identity disclosure of the
anonymous speakers).
88. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
89. Columbia Ins. Co., v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
90. Id. at 579–80.
91. Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426–27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
92. Dendrite, 775 A.2d 756.
93. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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Yahoo! to divulge a defendant’s identity. 94 When addressing the
strength of Dendrite’s defamation claim, the court held that a plaintiff
must not only “identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly
made by each anonymous poster” 95 but also “establish[] that its
action can withstand a motion to dismiss.” 96 To do so, “the plaintiff
must produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause
of action, on a prima facie basis.” 97 Dendrite could not show the
statements were both defamatory and caused actual harm. 98 Thus,
Dendrite could not overcome this burden, and the court did not
compel disclosure. 99
Similarly, in Doe v. Cahill, 100 an elected city councilman, Patrick
Cahill, and his wife Julia sued an anonymous blogger over statements
the blogger made on a website for citizens to voice “opinions about
public issues.” 101 Initially the Cahills sought and received a court
order compelling Comcast, the owner of Doe’s Internet Protocol (IP)
address, to reveal the identity of the online bloggers. 102 The lower
court applied a good faith standard and limited its analysis to “the
initial pleadings and motion papers.” 103 On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court rejected the good faith standard. Instead, the court
required the Cahills to support their “defamation claim with facts
sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” 104 Because the
Cahills failed to satisfy this summary judgment standard, the court

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 772.
100. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
101. Id. at 454.
102. Cahill v. Doe, 879 A.2d 943, 945 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d
451 (Del. 2005).
103. Id. at 954.
104. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460. However, Cahill further held that “a public figure defamation plaintiff
must only plead and prove facts with regard to elements of the claim that are within his control.” Id. at
464. The court reasoned that it is “difficult, if not impossible” for a public figure “[w]ithout discovery of
the defendant's identity, [to] satisfy[] [the] element” of actual malice, as required by the law of
defamation. Id. at 464.
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reversed, remanded, and instructed the lower court to dismiss the
plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. 105
Whether labeled as a motion to dismiss standard with a heightened
level of scrutiny or a summary judgment standard, both Dendrite and
Cahill effectively required actual evidence of each element of
defamation within the plaintiffs’ control. 106 A California court
addressing this issue found “it unnecessary and potentially confusing
to attach a procedural label, whether summary judgment or motion to
dismiss, to the showing required of a plaintiff seeking the identity of
an anonymous speaker on the Internet.” 107 Avoiding such labels, this
court in Krinsky v. Doe 108 required that a defamation plaintiff
“produce evidence of . . . those material facts that are accessible to
her” 109 before the court will compel the disclosure of an anonymous
blogger’s identity. The court reversed a denial of an anonymous
blogger’s motion to quash a subpoena seeking his identity. It found
that the alleged defamatory comments were non-actionable, “crude,
satirical hyperbole.” 110 Though articulated differently, Dendrite,
Cahill, and Krinsky all required actual evidence of defamation before
compelling disclosure.
C. An Additional Balancing Test
Some courts apply a balancing test and consider additional factors
when determining whether to compel the identity disclosure of an
anonymous speaker. 111 Such factors include whether the plaintiff

105. Id. at 468; see also Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720, 723–24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)
(adopting the summary judgment standard of Cahill, but finding that while the plaintiff alleged
sufficient facts to overcome a summary judgment motion, the court failed to balance the interests of
plaintiff and anonymous blogger).
106. See supra notes 101–114 and accompanying text.
107. Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 245.
110. Id. at 250. The allegedly defamatory statements directed towards corporate executives included
“mega scum bag,” “cockroach,” and “boobs, losers and crooks.” Id. at 235.
111. See, e.g., Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. Conn. 2008); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe,
170 P.3d 712, 720–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457
(Md. 2009); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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truly needs the identity disclosed 112 and whether there is an
alternative way to obtain the information. 113 The seminal case to
invoke a balancing test is Dendrite. There a New Jersey appeals court
held that even after the plaintiff presents evidence sufficient to
support a prima facie cause of action, “the court must balance the
defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous . . . speech against
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for
the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to allow the
plaintiff to properly proceed.” 114 Cahill, on the other hand, declined
to adopt such a balancing test, finding it “unnecessary.” 115 The Cahill
court reasoned that the balancing test “adds no protection above and
beyond that of the summary judgment test and needlessly
complicates the analysis.” 116
II. THE EXTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Courts considering whether to compel the disclosure of a speaker’s
identity often bluntly assert that the First Amendment protects
anonymity. 117 This conclusion is usually based on four Supreme
112. Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255; In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online,
Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. America Online, Inc. v.
Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
113. Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720. At least one court has also
considered “the subpoenaed party’s expectation of privacy at the time the online material was posted.”
Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255 (citing Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does One–Forty, 326 F.
Supp.2d 556, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
114. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61; see also Indep. Newspapers, 966 A.2d at 457 (adopting a
balancing test); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 723–24 (same); Doe v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 257 (same).
115. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). The court’s application of heightened review was
not explicitly based on the plaintiff’s public-figure status. See id. However, applying this review
naturally burdens public figures more than private plaintiffs. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding in defamation, public figures, unlike private ones, must prove falsity
and actual malice).
116. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461; accord Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC,
2006 WL 2091695 at *4 (D. Ariz. Jul 25, 2006) (adopting the Cahill approach in an action involving
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, trademark infringement and other non-defamation causes
of action); Reunion Indus., Inc. v. Doe, 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 454–55 (C.P. Penn. 2007) (adopting
Cahill’s summary judgment standard in a commercial disparagement action and not conducting a
separate balancing test).
117. See, e.g., Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 683 (Wis. 2006) (“[T]he decision to remain
anonymous is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”) (citing McIntyre
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Court cases: Talley v. California, 118 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, 119 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, 120 and Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v.
Village of Stratton. 121 However, as Part II.A explains, these cases
suggest that constitutional protection for anonymity is limited. Each
case considered a law requiring disclosure as a prior condition on
speech, and none were driven by a general right to anonymity. 122
These four Supreme Court cases reveal that when state action
burdens certain types of speech, courts should be vigilant—but how
vigilant? Often, constitutional questions are determined by how
closely a court decides to scrutinize state action. 123 Applying a low
level of scrutiny to state action requires that a state exhibit a
legitimate government reason for its actions and that its actions are
rationally related to this reason. 124 Most laws are upheld under this
standard, known as rational basis. 125 Heightened scrutiny, often
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995)); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 456 (“This [First
Amendment] protection extends to anonymous internet speech.”); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 775 A.2d
756, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“It is well-established that rights afforded by the First
Amendment remain protected even when engaged in anonymously.”); see also Victoria Ekstrand,
Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405,
409–13 (2003) (discussing cases); Vogel, supra note 48, at 824–31 (same).
118. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
119. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
120. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
121. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
122. Vogel, supra note 48 at 824–32.
123. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (acknowledging that
strict scrutiny is often “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” (citation omitted)); Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (recognizing that strict scrutiny was often
considered “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 808–09,
812–13 (2006) (determining that there are many recent decisions applying strict scrutiny but upholding a
law nonetheless).
124. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–17 (1976) (applying rational basis
review to a mandatory retirement age for police officers to find that state police officers over the age of
fifty are not a suspect class and the state has a rational basis in public safety to justify its actions).
125. See, e.g., id.; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–57 (1973) (applying
rational basis review and upholding a Texas public school funding formula despite its unequal
distribution of funds); General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (upholding a sales tax
exemption under rational basis review to find no equal protection violation because the State had a
rational basis for its gas utility regulation); see also Gunther, supra note 133, at 18–19 (referring to the
traditionally low bar of rational basis review). But see generally Winkler, supra note 133, at 808–09
(discussing several cases invalidating laws under what seems to be “rational basis with bite” (quoting
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called strict scrutiny, requires the government to show that its reasons
are compelling and its actions are narrowly tailored to further
them. 126 Few laws can survive this level of review. 127 There are also
various intermediate levels of scrutiny, 128 and it is here the Supreme
Court found its answer. In the summer of 2010, in Doe v. Reed, the
Supreme Court decided that when political speech is burdened by
disclosure laws, exacting scrutiny is appropriate. 129 This decision
makes it even clearer that although there may be compelling reasons
to vigorously protect one’s right to speak anonymously, 130 the First
Amendment will only go so far.
A. Four Anonymous Speech Cases and the Fundamental Interests at
Stake
1. Four Anonymous Speech Cases
The first time the Supreme Court seemed to expressly recognize a
First Amendment protection of anonymity was in 1960 in Talley v.
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other Name, 62 IND.
L.J. 779 (1987))).
126. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (invalidating an Oklahoma law
requiring the sterilization of individuals with three convictions finding it failed to stand up to strict
scrutiny); see generally Winkler, supra note 133, at 798–802 (2006) (discussing the evolution of strict
scrutiny).
127. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1160 (2002) (“When a
law burdens [a fundamental] right, it merely triggers strict scrutiny—which, as everyone knows, is
almost always fatal.”). But see Winkler, supra note 133, at 808–09 (discussing challenges to the “myth”
that strict scrutiny is fatal in fact).
128. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny and holding
gender classification “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64–65 (1976) (per curiam) (applying
exacting scrutiny to a campaign finance disclosure law); see also infra Part II.B (discussing Doe v.
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010)).
129. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (clarifying that exacting scrutiny “requires a
‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental
interest” (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010)). Prior to this
case, it was not clear that exacting scrutiny was anything different than strict scrutiny. See Buckley v.
Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 214 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing
that although Buckley v. Valeo purportedly applied a strict scrutiny test, “its formulation . . . was more
forgiving than the traditional understanding of that exacting standard”).
130. See Lidsky, supra note 18, at 888–92. Lidsky points out that compelled disclosure “may subject
the [speaker] to ostracism for expressing unpopular ideas, invite retaliation from those who oppose her
ideas or from those whom she criticizes, or simply give unwanted exposure to her mental processes.” Id.
at 890.
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California. 131 In Talley, the Court invalidated a Los Angeles city
ordinance requiring that handbills 132 distributed in the city include
the identity of those involved in its distribution. 133 The law on its face
applied to “any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances.”134
Although the Supreme Court typically applies something less than
strict scrutiny to content-neutral laws of general applicability such as
this, 135 it seemed to apply heightened scrutiny here. 136 Its reasoning
was based in part on the Los Angeles ordinance’s sweeping nature.137
The ordinance was not “limited to handbills whose content is
‘obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates unlawful
conduct.’” 138 The Court expressly did “not pass on the validity of an
ordinance limited to prevent these or any other supposed evils.”139
Further, the Court analogized this case to Bates v. City of Little
Rock 140 and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 141 both of which
applied heightened scrutiny, reasoning that “identification and fear of
reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters
of importance.” 142
In 1995, the Court, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,
invalidated an Ohio statute that prohibited “the distribution of

131. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); see also, Vogel, supra note 48, at 826. This was nearly
200 years after the Federalist papers, pseudonymously written articles in favor of the adoption of the
Constitution. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
132. The Los Angeles ordinance defines handbills as “any hand-bill, dodger, commercial advertising
circular, folder, booklet, letter, card, pamphlet, sheet, poster, sticker, banner, notice or other written,
printed, sticker, banner, notice or other written, printed or painted matter calculated to attract attention of
the public.” L.A., CAL., CODE § 28, quoted in and invalidated by Talley, 362 U.S. at 64, 66 n.4.
133. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
134. Id. at 63 (quoting L.A., CAL., CODE §28.06).
135. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“[R]egulations that are unrelated to
the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny . . . .”).
136. Talley, 362 U.S.at 65 (analogizing to cases applying strict scrutiny to content-neutral laws
because of their effect on the freedom to freely associate). Justice Harlan expressly applied strict
scrutiny in his concurring opinion. Talley, 362 U.S. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 63.
138. Id. at 64.
139. Id.
140. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (invalidating city tax ordinance because
its requirement of membership disclosure violated the constitutional right to association).
141. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (invalidating an order requiring
the disclosure of members of the NAACP).
142. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
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anonymous campaign literature.” 143 After reiterating the importance
of anonymity in American literary history, the Court asserted that the
“interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure
as a condition of entry.” 144 This protection of anonymity, the Court
reasoned, extends to the political realm. 145 Because “this case
‘involve[d] a limitation on political expression [it was] subject to
exacting scrutiny.’” 146 Under such heightened scrutiny, the Court
invalidated Ohio’s law. 147 The Court found that the government’s
purpose of deterring false statements, though “assuredly
legitimate,” 148 failed to justify the law’s “extremely broad
prohibition.” 149 It also reasoned that Ohio’s anonymity ban did not
“directly attack[] . . . election-related libel” 150 but rather was “merely
a supplement” 151 to its libel law.
Three years later in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc., 152 the Court upheld the invalidation of a Colorado
election law requiring those circulating petitions to wear nameidentifying badges. 153 The Court reasoned that “the First Amendment
requires us to be vigilant in making . . . judgments, to guard against
undue hindrances to political conversations and the exchange of
ideas.” 154 In a footnote, the Court asserted that its “decision is
entirely in keeping with the ‘now-settled approach’ that state
regulations ‘impos[ing] “severe burdens” on speech . . . [must] be
143. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1995). The Ohio law applied only
to publications “designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote
the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters of any election.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3599.09(A) (1988), invalidated by McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338, 357. The law also disallowed anonymous
financing of such political communications. Id.
144. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 343. The Court details several historical examples of anonymity in political speech. Id. at
343 n.6.
146. Id. at 346 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
147. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
148. Id. at 351.
149. Id. at 350–51.
150. Id. at 350 n.13.
151. Id.
152. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
153. Id. at 200.
154. Id. at 192 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988)).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/12

18

Baumrind: Protecting Online Anonymity and Preserving Reputation Through Due

2011]

PROTECTING ONLINE ANONYMITY

775

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’” 155 This
language suggested the Court was employing strict scrutiny, the law’s
highest level of scrutiny. 156 The Court held that Colorado’s badge
requirement “discourages participation in the petition circulation
process by forcing name identification without sufficient cause.”157
Finally, the Court found Colorado’s disclosure requirement “no more
than tenuously related to the substantial interests disclosure
serves.” 158
In his concurring opinion in Buckley, Justice Thomas expressly
adhered to a strict scrutiny analysis of Colorado’s disclosure laws. 159
According to Justice Thomas:
When considering the constitutionality of a state election
regulation that restricts core political speech or imposes ‘severe
burdens’ on speech or association, . . . the law [must] be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. But if the
law imposes ‘lesser burdens,’ . . . the State’s important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions. 160

Justice Thomas argued that “restrictions on core political speech so
plainly impose a ‘severe burden.’” 161 He stated that the State’s
justification, to “help[] the public . . . identify, and the
State . . . apprehend, petition circulators who perpetrate fraud . . . is
not narrowly tailored.” 162 Justice Thomas further argued that,
although Colorado’s requirement that paid circulators identify
themselves by name fails to constitute a “severe burden,” 163 a “strict

155. Id. at 192 n.12 (quoting Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
156. See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
157. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 200.
158. Id. at 203–04 (1998). Those interests include providing a “control or check on domination of the
initiative process by affluent special interest groups.” Id. at 202.
159. Id. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 208.
162. Id. at 210.
163. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 212.

Published by Reading Room, 2011

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 12

776

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:4

test” 164 was nonetheless warranted as the disclosure requirement “can
seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by
the First Amendment.” 165 Under this strict test, Justice Thomas
supported the invalidation of the paid circulator provision. He found
that the “State’s interest in informing the public of the financial
interests behind an initiative proposal is not compelling during the
petitioning stage.” 166
In 2002, the Supreme Court addressed anonymous speech in
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Village of
Stratton. 167 The Court considered a facial challenge to an ordinance
requiring that all door-to-door advocates register and receive a permit
prior to canvassing. 168 The Sixth Circuit upheld the ordinance
applying intermediate scrutiny because the ordinance was contentneutral. 169 The Supreme Court reversed but found it unnecessary to
determine what standard of review to apply. 170 The Court reasoned
that “the breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature
of the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding it.” 171 It held that the ordinance (1) swept too broadly
“covering unpopular causes unrelated to commercial transactions or
to any special interest in protecting the electoral process,” 172 (2)
imposed “an objective burden on some speech of citizens holding
religious or patriotic views,” 173 and (3) impeded spontaneous
speech. 174 Furthermore, the ordinance was not “tailored” to
preventing fraud, the asserted government interest. 175 In finding the

164. Id. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per
curiam)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 213 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
168. Id. at 153.
169. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 560–61 (6th
Cir., 2001), rev’d, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
170. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 164.
171. Id. The Court further asserted, “The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises
constitutional concerns.” Id. at 165.
172. Id. at 167.
173. Id.
174. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 167.
175. Id. at 168.
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ordinance unconstitutional, the Court seemed most offended by the
requirement that “in the context of everyday public discourse a
citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her
neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so.” 176
2. Fundamental Interests
In the four anonymous speech cases discussed above, the Supreme
Court has revealed its First Amendment concerns when anonymity
interests are at stake: preventing conditions on entering the
marketplace of ideas, 177 protecting core political speech, 178 and
avoiding a burden on one’s right to freely associate. 179 Disclosure
laws implicating one of these interests warrant some form of
heightened scrutiny. 180
a. Preventing Conditions on Entering the Marketplace of Ideas
Requiring identity disclosure as a condition to entry into the
marketplace of ideas is a government action warranting heightened
scrutiny. 181 Such action is considered a “prior restraint on anonymous

176. Id. at 166.
177. See infra notes 191–200 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 201–15 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 216–27 and accompanying text.
180. See infra Parts II.A.2 and II.B. Presumably, if such strong interests are not implicated, some
lesser form of scrutiny is warranted. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997)
(reasoning that government action burdening non-fundamental rights must meet the lesser standard of
being rationally related to a legitimate government purpose). In First Amendment jurisprudence,
content-based regulations on speech generally receive strict scrutiny. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116–18 (1991). However, defamation law
seems to be based on the content of the speech and yet the “compelling state interest test is not
employed in some contexts.” Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: To America’s Tomorrow—Commerce,
Communication, and the Future of Free Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2007). See also Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967) (“Thus some antithesis between freedom of speech and
press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and limits the
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their
substantial accuracy.”). Justice Harlan suggests this is because libel law is premised not on the content
of the speech but on the conduct of the defendant. Id. at 153.
181. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 150; Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). See McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)
(applying exacting scrutiny to a campaign contribution disclosure law); see also Vogel, supra note 48, at
831.
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speech,” 182 and the Supreme Court has treated it as an infringement
on a fundamental right. 183
In Talley, for example, the Court was concerned that the city’s
broad, content-neutral requirement of identity disclosure would deter
individuals from entering peaceful discourse. 184 Similarly, in
Watchtower the Court expressed concern over a “requirement of
registration in order to make a public speech.” 185 This prior restraint
resulted in “a significant amount of spontaneous speech that is
effectively banned.” 186 The Court was even clearer in McIntyre when
it condemned Ohio for “requiring disclosure as a condition of
entry.” 187 While common law defamation also has a similar effect of
deterring some from entering public discourse, 188 the McIntyre Court
acknowledged Ohio’s legitimate use of defamation law to deter
libelous speech. 189 It held, however, that prior restraint laws failing
heightened scrutiny are unacceptable. 190
b. Protecting Core Political Speech
In Buckley, Justice Ginsburg reiterated a long-standing notion that
“‘core political speech’ [such as that] involv[ing] ‘interactive
communication concerning political change’” 191 is speech for which
“First Amendment protection . . . is ‘at its zenith.’” 192 She thus
182. Vogel, supra note 48, at 831.
183. See infra notes 194–200 and accompanying text.
184. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
185. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 164 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945)).
186. Id. at 167.
187. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
188. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 888; see also infra note 294 (discussing the legitimate deterrent effect
of libel law).
189. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 350–51 n.13.
190. Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64–65 (1976) (per curiam) (applying some form of
heightened scrutiny to a campaign finance disclosure law); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found.,
Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 214 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing that although Buckley v. Valeo
purportedly applied a strict scrutiny test, “its formulation . . . was more forgiving than the traditional
understanding of that exacting standard”).
191. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. at 186 (majority opinion) (quoting
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988)).
192. Id. at 187 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988)); see also Eu v. S.F. County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (“[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most
urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” (quoting Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971))).
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required “vigilan[ce] in . . . guard[ing] against undue hindrances to
political conversations and the exchange of ideas.” 193 She suggested
that such vigilance takes the form of strict scrutiny. 194
As it turns out, strict scrutiny is too vigilant. In Doe v. Reed, the
Court clarified that while heightened scrutiny is appropriate when
core political speech is at issue, when it comes to disclosure
requirements, the level of review is exacting scrutiny, not strict. 195
The Court pointed out that Washington’s Public Records Act and
similar disclosure requirements are not prohibitions on speech. 196
Thus, strict scrutiny is too strict. 197 Rather, when these disclosure
mandates implicate a fundamental right such as the right to speak
freely on political issues, exacting scrutiny is the appropriate level of
review. 198
This is consistent with the Court’s decision in McIntyre. There, the
Court applied “exacting scrutiny” 199 in part because the law at issue,
limiting anonymous campaign literature, burdened political
expression but did not prohibit it.200 Commentators after McIntyre
questioned whether such exacting scrutiny would protect nonpolitical
anonymous speech. 201 Watchtower 202 may have answered that
question. 203 In Watchtower, the Court invalidated a prior restraint on
speech that was not political. 204 However, it did so without
determining a level of scrutiny and suggested that another
193. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192 (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421).
194. Id. at 192 n.12 (1998) (quoting Buckley, 525 U.S. at 208–09 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
195. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820 n.2 (2010); see also infra Part II.B.
196. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2818.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
200. See id. at 346.
201. Ekstrand, supra note 126, at 413 (citing George H. Carr, Note, Application of U.S. Supreme
Court Doctrine to Anonymity in the Networld, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 521, 535 (1996)); Donald J. Karl,
Comment, State Regulation of Anonymous Internet Use After ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 513, 529 (1998); Michael H. Spencer, Anonymous Internet Communication and the First
Amendment: A Crack in the Dam of National Sovereignty, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 3 (1998)).
202. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
203. Watchtower is considered the “first time [the Court considered] the extent to which prior
disclosure requirements are permissible in a context not involving election regulation.” Vogel, supra
note 48, at 829.
204. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 167–68.
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fundamental right might be at stake—the right to freely express one’s
religious beliefs. 205
c. Protecting the Right to Freely Associate
Generally, the government may not inquire into one’s private
associations without a compelling justification. 206 This was one of the
Court’s major concerns in Talley. 207 The broad prohibition on
anonymous speech could potentially scare off individuals fearing the
ramifications of associating with a particular cause. 208 Talley relied
on Bates v. City of Little Rock 209 and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson 210 for the proposition that “there are times and
circumstances when States may not compel members of groups
engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified.” 211
In both Bates and Patterson, the Supreme Court found that a
compelled disclosure law, as applied to the NAACP, violated its
members’ constitutional right to freely associate. In Patterson, the
Court held that this freedom “is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”212
The Court called for “the closest scrutiny” when the government
infringes upon one’s freedom to associate, regardless of whether the
association “pertain[s] to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters.” 213 It acknowledged that past identity revelations had
“exposed . . . members to economic reprisal, loss of employment,
205. Id. at 167. Petitioners in Watchtower argued that strict scrutiny should apply because “the
ordinance potentially infringes upon two constitutionally protected rights—freedom of speech and
freedom of religion—thereby making their claim one of ‘hybrid rights.’” Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 2001) rev’d, Watchtower, 536
U.S. 150 (2002). The Supreme Court did not address this argument, but its emphasis on the “objective
burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views” suggests it gave the argument
some credibility. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 167.
206. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524–25 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); Karl, supra note 211, at 530 (citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963)).
207. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
208. Id. at 65.
209. Bates, 361 U.S. 516.
210. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449.
211. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
212. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (citation omitted).
213. Id. at 460–61.
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threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
hostility.” 214 The Court’s concern, that the law may “induce members
to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining
it,” warranted strict scrutiny. 215 Failing that standard, the law as
applied to the NAACP was unconstitutional. 216
Cases such as Bates and Patterson have led to the possibility of asapplied challenges based on this freedom to associate. Doe v. Reed
makes this proposition clear. In Doe v. Reed, the Court applied
exacting scrutiny to disclosures implicating political speech but
suggested that a showing of likely harassment would warrant even
higher scrutiny. 217
d. Other Interests in Anonymity
The Supreme Court has articulated other concerns when the state
burdens speech by disallowing anonymity. In Watchtower, for
example, the Court was not only dissatisfied with the ordinance’s
pre-speech disclosure requirement, 218 but it also found that this
requirement “imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens
holding religious or patriotic views.” 219 However, contrary to Justice
Scalia’s concerns, 220 the Supreme Court has not articulated a
generally applicable right to anonymity. In McIntyre, for example,
the Court only considered a broad, pre-speech disclosure requirement
and framed the “case [as] ‘involv[ing] a limitation on political
214. Id. at 462.
215. Id. at 462–63; accord Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101–02
(1982); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (finding city tax ordinance requiring the
disclosure of membership lists violated the members constitutional right to freely associate).
216. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466.
217. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2009); see also id. at 2822–27 (Alito, J., concurring)
(arguing that plaintiffs will likely prevail because of a reasonable probability of harassment if their
names are disclosed); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (per curiam) (applying something less
than strict scrutiny to a campaign finance disclosure law but leaving open the possibility of “a case,
similar to those before the Court in NAACP v. Alabama [ex rel. Patterson] and Bates, where the threat
to exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so
insubstantial that the Act’s requirements cannot be constitutionally applied” (citations omitted)).
218. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002).
219. Id. at 167.
220. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority’s “unprecedented protection for anonymous speech” was so broad that it “seemingly
invalidated” a variety of laws that infringed upon anonymity generally).
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expression subject to exacting scrutiny.’” 221 Therefore, it seems that
the First Amendment’s rigorous protection of anonymous speech, just
as its protection of speech in general, 222 is dependent upon the class
of speech at issue. 223
B. Doe v. Reed: No Blanket Right to Anonymity in the State Political
Process
In the four cases discussed above, the Supreme Court seemed to
treat certain concerns as if they implicated fundamental rights and
thus applied heightened, or even strict, scrutiny to laws stripping
speakers of their anonymity. 224 Doe v. Reed, the Court’s most recent
anonymous speech decision, however, expressly rejects strict scrutiny
of disclosure laws involving political speech. 225 The implication is
221. Id. at 346 (majority opinion) (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)); see also Reed,
130 S. Ct. at 2831 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Justice Scalia conceives of the issue as a right to
anonymous speech. But our decision in McIntyre posited no such freewheeling right.” (citation
omitted)).
222. The Supreme Court makes distinctions among classes of speech when analyzing the level of First
Amendment scrutiny to apply. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (recognizing that the “Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression”); see also Collins supra 190, at
14–15 (“[C]lassification of the kinds of expression involved informs the test to be employed.”); Carr,
supra note 211, at 536 (“American free-speech jurisprudence has long recognized that speech is
protected according to the valuation of its content by the government.”) (citation omitted)).
223. See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 WL 61635 at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 7,
2011) (“[W]e suggest that the nature of the speech should be a driving force in choosing a standard by
which to balance the rights of anonymous speakers in discovery disputes.” (citing Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2010); Doe v. Reed, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2817-18
(2010))).
224. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192 n.12 (1998) (describing its
decision as “in keeping with the ‘now settled approach’ that state regulations ‘impos[ing] “severe
burdens” on speech . . . [must] be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest’” (alterations in
original) (quoting Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring)); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336, 346 (1995) (finding the right of assembly is a fundamental right, and that
“limitation[s] on political expression [are] subject to exacting scrutiny” (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 420 (1988)); Talley v. California 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning
that “state action impinging on free speech and association will not be sustained unless the governmental
interest asserted to support such impingement is compelling” and failing to find the government action
limited to a compelling interest). But see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164 (2002) (declining to determine the standard of review to apply to a content
neutral law with the effect of stripping individuals of their right to speak anonymously because “the
breadth of the speech affected . . . and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Court of
Appeals erred in upholding it”).
225. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818, 2820 n.2 (2010).
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that the lesser standard of exacting scrutiny is appropriate when
disclosure laws burden a fundamental right. 226
Doe v. Reed addressed a facial challenge to Washington State’s
Public Records Act (PRA). 227 The case arose out of Washington
Governor Christine Gregoire’s decision to sign Senate Bill (SB) 5688
into law, granting same-sex partners rights equal to that of any other
state-registered domestic partner. 228 In response, an organization,
known as Protect Marriage Washington, gathered more than the
requisite 120,000 signatures it needed to put SB 5688 to a popular
vote in the form of a referendum. 229 The efforts of Protect Marriage
Washington ultimately failed when 53% of Washington voters
approved of SB 5688. 230
Before the SB 5688 vote, a group of concerned citizens made a
formal request under the PRA for the names of the signatories of the
Protect Marriage Washington petition. 231 The PRA entitles individual
citizens access to public records upon request. 232 Washington
asserted that referendum petitions are public records within the
meaning of the PRA. 233 The requesters intended to post online the
names of people who signed the petition, prompting Protect Marriage
Washington and some of its petition signers to seek an injunction. 234
The Supreme Court was not asked whether disclosure of the
particular names on the Protect Marriage Washington petition
violates the First Amendment. 235 Rather, the only question to make
its way to the Supreme Court was whether the PRA is
unconstitutional as applied to referendum petitions generally. 236 The
226. Id. at 2820 n.2 (2010) (“Justice Thomas’s contrary assessment of the relationship between the
disclosure of referendum petitions generally and the State’s interest in this case is based on his
determination that strict scrutiny applies rather than the [exacting scrutiny] standard of review we have
concluded is appropriate.” (citations omitted)).
227. Id. at 2811.
228. Id. at 2816.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816.
232. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008).
233. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2817.
236. Id.
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Court reasoned that signing a political petition constitutes “the
expression of a political view [and thus] implicates a First
Amendment right.” 237 Next, it addressed how closely courts should
scrutinize disclosure requirements implicating this First Amendment
right. 238
The Court explained that when political speech is at issue,
“exacting scrutiny” is appropriate. 239 This heightened level of review
“requires a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement
and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” 240 Under
exacting scrutiny, the Court found that Washington’s governmental
interests were sufficiently important. 241 Washington sought to
“preserv[e] the integrity of the electoral process by combating fraud,
detecting invalid signatures, and fostering government transparency
and accountability.” 242 The Court held that public disclosure
substantially furthers this interest. 243
Finally, the Court left open the possibility of an as-applied
challenge to the PRA. The Court explained that “disclosure ‘would
be unconstitutional as applied to an organization if there were a
reasonable probability that the group’s members would face threats,
harassment or reprisals if their names were disclosed.’” 244
Doe v. Reed clarified that when mandated disclosure burdens the
right to speak on political issues, exacting scrutiny is appropriate. 245
The four anonymous speech cases discussed in Part II.A suggest that
there may also be other fundamental rights that, when burdened by
disclosure laws, warrant this level of scrutiny. 246 Thus, Supreme
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2818 (citations omitted).
239. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (citations omitted).
240. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 914 (2010)). Justice Thomas criticized this decision to apply exacting scrutiny rather than strict
scrutiny. Id. at 2839 (Thomas, J. dissenting). This position is consistent with his concurrence in Buckley
v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 206 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also supra notes 169–76 and accompanying text.
241. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2819–20.
242. Id. at 2819.
243. Id. at 2820.
244. Id. at 2821 (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010)).
245. Infra notes 235–53 and accompanying text.
246. Infra Part II.A.2.
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Court precedent provides the basis for a due process approach to
deciding whether to compel disclosure in anonymous defamation
cases. 247
III. DUE PROCESS PROTECTS ONLINE ANONYMITY AND
PRESERVES REPUTATION
New technology invites new legal standards. 248 Many courts have
accepted this invitation when considering whether to compel the
disclosure of identity of an anonymous blogger in a defamation
suit. 249 These courts have developed varying approaches in efforts to
balance the interests of the potentially defamed against the purported
First Amendment right of anonymity. 250 However, others like the
New York court in Cohen argue against new rules, asserting that
existing procedural safeguards combined with libel law provide
adequate First Amendment protection. 251 Courts need not develop
new standards but, rather, should apply due process jurisprudence to
this new issue to ensure an adequate balance of interests.
A. What is Due Process?
The Fourteenth Amendment states that no “State [shall] deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,” 252 and the First Amendment protection of speech is
incorporated as a protected liberty. 253 Further, as explained in Part II,
prohibiting anonymity may significantly infringe upon one’s

247. Supra Part III.
248. See, e.g., Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Dudnick, 678 A.2d 266, 268–70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (acknowledging that the advent of computers invited a new test to determine whether
computerized records satisfy the business records hearsay exception but rejecting this idea, finding
generally applicable business records exception satisfactorily considers necessary hearsay concerns).
249. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455–56 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d
756, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
250. Supra Part I.
251. See Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009); see also Vogel, supra note
48, at 855–56.
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
253. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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constitutional right to speak. 254 Before the State can do so, it must
provide due process of law. 255 Due process has two components:
procedural due process and substantive due process. 256
1. Procedural Due Process
At a minimum, procedural due process requires that before there is
a deprivation of liberty, one deserves notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 257 “[T]he two central concerns of procedural due process [are]
the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the
promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the
decision-making process.” 258 In the context of post-speech compelled
identity disclosure, this means the anonymous speaker must receive
notice of the motion seeking her identity and the chance to argue
against it. 259
As discussed in Part I.A, courts already require such procedural
due process. Most courts mandate that the defamation plaintiff take
reasonable steps towards notifying the anonymous blogger of the
pending disclosure request. 260 The debate over pre-action identity
disclosure in potential online defamation suits is therefore not
concerned with whether speakers are granted procedural due process.
Instead, the debate is whether the Constitution requires something
more.

254. See supra Part II and notes 126–86 and accompanying text.
255. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
256. 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 901 (1998) (“[T]he concept of due process of law has a
dual aspect, substantive and procedural.” (citations omitted)).
257. See LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998) (“The core of due process is the right to
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (citation omitted)); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579
(1975) (“At the very minimum, therefore, students facing suspension and the consequent interference
with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of
hearing.”); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (holding that due
process requires any deprivation of life, liberty, or property “be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”).
258. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
259. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to “undertake efforts
to notify the anonymous poster that he is subject of a subpoena or application for order of disclosure”).
260. Supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
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2. Something More: Substantive Due Process and Exacting
Scrutiny
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court provided a sound
framework for determining whether in light of a liberty deprivation,
the Constitution requires something more than notice and a
hearing. 261 The Court explained two levels of review: strict scrutiny
and rational basis. A State cannot establish a law that directly
infringes on a fundamental right unless the State can satisfy strict
scrutiny by showing that the law is narrowly tailored to achieving a
compelling state interest. 262 Non-fundamental rights, however, can be
burdened so long as the infringement satisfies traditional rational
review, that is, it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.263
To determine if the right is fundamental, a court carefully describes
the asserted right and then determines whether that right is
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberties.” 264
Recent Supreme Court precedent, however, provides for an
additional level of review in cases where state action affects but does
not directly attack a fundamental right. For example, the Supreme
Court recognizes a fundamental right to privacy and autonomy when
making choices about reproduction. 265 State anti-abortion laws
burdening these rights may nonetheless be valid under a level of
review less than strict scrutiny. 266 Most recently, the Court has
applied a similar approach to disclosure laws burdening fundamental
free speech rights. 267
261. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
262. See id. at 720–22.
263. See id. at 722.
264. Id. at 720–21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
265. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685–86 (1977) (invalidating a law requiring
licensed pharmacists to distribute contraceptives because it infringed on the fundamental right to make
decisions regarding child-rearing); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating a
forced sterilization law for habitual criminals in part because of the fundamental nature of personal
procreation choices).
266. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (rejecting strict scrutiny and applying an
“undue burden” test to certain abortion regulations that do not strike directly at the right to privacy in
childbearing decisions).
267. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010).
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Laws requiring disclosure may affect, but not directly attack,
certain fundamental free speech rights. 268 Such disclosure laws “may
burden the ability to speak, but . . . do not prevent anyone from
speaking.” 269 As Doe v. Reed explains, in such cases the proper level
of review is exacting scrutiny. 270 Importantly, however, Doe v. Reed
follows a line of cases suggesting that exacting scrutiny is appropriate
“in the electoral context.” 271 This is because free speech on political
topics is fundamental. 272 Presumably, when disclosure laws burden
speech not deemed fundamental, courts should apply rational basis
review. 273 This substantive due process analysis is applicable to cases
of pre-action identity disclosure in potential defamation suits.274
B. Due Process in Action: Disclosure in Potential Defamation Suits
Courts invariably apply procedural due process in the anonymous
defamation context. 275 However, courts should also rely on
substantive due process: first deciding whether a heightened
standard—in this case, exacting scrutiny—is appropriate, and if so,
applying it.
1. Whether to Apply Heightened Scrutiny
The two-pronged exacting scrutiny standard described above 276 is
only necessary if a fundamental right is at stake. 277 Courts determine
whether a right is fundamental in light of history, tradition, and the
right’s role in the concept of ordered liberty. 278 As explained above in
268. Id.
269. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010), quoted in Reed, 130 S. Ct.
at 2818.
270. Id.; supra Part II.B, notes 249–253 and accompanying text.
271. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2818.
272. See supra Part II.A.2.b (discussing the fundamental right to free speech on political issues).
273. See infra Part III.B.1.d.
274. Infra Part III.B.
275. See supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text.
277. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–22 (1997) (requiring heightened scrutiny only
when a fundamental right is at stake); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (applying exacting
scrutiny because the disclosure laws burdened political speech rights).
278. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/12

32

Baumrind: Protecting Online Anonymity and Preserving Reputation Through Due

2011]

PROTECTING ONLINE ANONYMITY

789

Part II.A, the Supreme Court has weighed these considerations and
articulated certain speech rights deserving of this heightened level of
review: the right to enter into the marketplace of ideas anonymously
and free of conditions, 279 the right to express political views
anonymously, 280 and the right to associate anonymously. 281 If a
defamation suit does not implicate a fundamental right, then
disclosure must merely pass the rational basis test.
a. Condition-Free Entry into the Marketplace of Ideas
Pre-action disclosure in anonymous defamation suits does not
implicate the First Amendment concern with placing conditions upon
the entry into the marketplace of ideas. Cases that consider whether
to compel the identity of an anonymous blogger after the posting of
the blog are not evaluating broad laws requiring disclosure as a
“condition of entry.” 282 Indeed, in such cases, the individual freely
and anonymously enters into the marketplace with no explicit
conditions. 283
Further, to the extent that the threat of a future defamation lawsuit
deters an anonymous blogger from entering the marketplace of ideas,
this is no different than how the law of defamation operates in nonanonymous situations. 284 Defamation jurisprudence naturally limits

279. Supra notes 191–200 and accompanying text.
280. Supra notes 201–15 and accompanying text.
281. Supra notes 216–27 and accompanying text.
282. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (emphasis added); see also
Vogel, supra note 48, at 837.
283. See Vogel, supra note 48, at 837–38.
284. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 888 (“Defamation law legitimately seeks to deter individuals from
communicating defamatory falsehoods; the problem arises, for First Amendment purposes when
defamation law ‘overdeters’—that is, when it deters speech that is truthful or nondefamatory—for such
speech occupies a ‘preferred position’ in the constitutional hierarchy of values.” (citation omitted));
Vogel, supra note 48, at 837–38 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that some risk of deterrence is
acceptable if closely tied to a legitimate governmental interest.”). Concededly, the law of defamation
itself may not provide adequate protections in non-anonymous situations. See generally Susan M. Gilles,
Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1753 (1998). Gilles explains that in a typical libel case, the First Amendment provides “no
protection[] at the initial pleading and discovery stages.” Id. at 1774. However, the issue of whether it is
too easy to bring a defamation suit generally, thus constraining free speech unconstitutionally, is beyond
the scope of this Note.
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one’s constitutional right to speak freely. 285 As Doe v. Cahill
acknowledges, “[c]ertain classes of speech, including defamatory and
libelous speech, are entitled to no Constitutional protection.” 286 The
Supreme Court has developed extensive law that cabins these limits
so as not to unnecessarily chill speech. 287 In doing so, the Court has
implicitly found that what is left of state defamation law does not on
its face violate the First Amendment’s protection of free speech
merely by putting speakers on notice that they may be subject to a
lawsuit if their speech is defamatory. 288 Fear of a future defamation
suit is meant to limit speech in order to protect citizens from damage
to their reputation. 289 Therefore, when deciding whether to compel
the disclosure of an anonymous blogger in a potential defamation
suit, the fundamental right to enter into the marketplace of ideas, free
from conditions, is not implicated.
b. Freedom to Anonymously Speak on Political Issues
In some potential online defamation suits, however, a fundamental
speech right is implicated, and disclosure may warrant exacting
scrutiny. For example, when the speech at issue is political,
compelling identity disclosure warrants the heightened standard. 290 In
Doe v. Cahill, the court applied a heightened standard when
addressing potential defamation in political speech. 291 The court
refused to force the disclosure of anonymous speakers’ identities
285. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 888–89.
286. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005).
287. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666–67 (1989) (holding
that a public figure plaintiff must show actual malice to sustain a claim of defamation against a media
defendant, and the showing of a profit motive is insufficient to satisfy this element); Phila. Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding private party plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity
in a defamation suit against a media defendant when the alleged defamation is a matter of public
concern); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring a showing of actual
malice when a public figure plaintiff sues in defamation).
288. See supra note 297 and infra note 299.
289. Vogel, supra note 48, at 831 (“Common-law claims against those whose speech constitutes
fraud, defamation or another wrong are an important part of the governmental mechanism for deterring
such wrongdoing. Indeed, the Court has recognized that common-law defamation claims provide an
essential safeguard protecting the public against the risk of abuse inherent in the right to speak
anonymously.”).
290. See supra Part II.A.2.b
291. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460.
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because the plaintiffs were unable to support their “defamation claim
with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” 292 The
court was also quick to point out that it was “the first State Supreme
Court to address this issue, particularly in the context of a case
involving political criticism of a public figure.” 293 Similarly, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that “a defamation plaintiff
should not be able to employ the rules of discovery to obtain the
identity of an anonymous political speaker simply by filing a
complaint that is facially unsustainable.” 294
In Greenbaum v. Google, an anonymous blogger criticized
Greenbaum, an elected school board member, for her opposition to
using public school money to support private school interests. 295 The
court did not require the production of evidence to support the merit
of the plaintiff’s defamation claim because it did not need to. 296 It
held that “the statements on which petitioner seeks to base her
defamation claim are plainly inactionable as a matter of law.”297
However, the court implied that some heightened scrutiny would be
appropriate considering Greenbaum sought relief “on the eve of a

292. Id. at 460. However, Cahill further held that “a public figure defamation plaintiff must only
plead and prove facts with regard to elements of the claim that are within his control.” Id. at 464. The
court reasoned that it is “difficult, if not impossible” for a public figure “[w]ithout discovery of the
defendant's identity, [to] satisfy[] [the] element” of actual malice, as required by the law of defamation.
Id.
293. Id. at 457 (emphasis added). Commentator Jason Miller acknowledges that heightened standards
are necessary in some but not all circumstances, but bases the distinction on the nature of the plaintiff
rather than the nature of the speech. Jason C. Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing
Between Public and Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation
Suits, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229 (2008). Miller’s approach utilizes the private/public figure distinction
of traditional defamation jurisprudence to “advocate[] [for] the adoption of a standard that makes it
easier to issue subpoenas against Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to reveal the identity of anonymous
posters when the plaintiff is a private figure while retaining and developing more difficult standards
when the plaintiff is a public figure.” Id. at 230. This approach would make it more difficult for Liksula
Cohen, arguably a public figure, to obtain the identity of the anonymous blogger who allegedly defamed
her. See Dowd, supra note 2 (stating that Cohen was a Vogue cover model). As discussed supra in Part
II, the Supreme Court has never evinced great concern over the type of anonymous speech at issue in
Cohen.
294. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 685 (Wis. 2006) (emphasis added).
295. Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S. 2d 695, 699–700 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
296. Id. at 698–99 (citing Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001)).
297. Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S. at 699.
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school board election,” 298 and thus compelling disclosure “would
have a chilling effect on protected political speech.” 299
c. Freedom to Anonymously Associate
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to
freely and anonymously associate. 300 If this right is implicated, courts
should apply heightened scrutiny to pre-action disclosure motions.301
The right of association has rarely been implicated when a
defamation plaintiff seeks the identity of a John Doe defendant. 302
One case in which this right was loosely at issue was Lassa v.
Rongstad. 303 In Lassa, a nonprofit organization educating the public
on policy issues refused to release the names of five of its members
who anonymously made statements about a local political
candidate. 304 In adopting a heightened standard to its review of
decisions to compel disclosure, 305 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
moved in part by concerns that divulging the group members’
identities impedes their freedom to associate. 306 As more cases come
to court, it is possible the First Amendment’s right to freely and

298. Id. at 701.
299. Id. (emphasis added).
300. See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text.
301. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 212 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing for strict scrutiny when associational rights are burdened).
302. Research for this Note revealed only one relevant case in which an associational right was
implicated. Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006). But see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d
1147, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the First Amendment right to free association protects
against the disclosure of political membership lists). Perry did not involve anonymous speakers. Id.; see
In re Anonymous Online Speakers, No. 09-71265, 2011 WL 61635 at *4 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2011) (“The
Perry decision rested on the importance of political association and political expression, and it did not
involve anonymous speakers.” (emphasis added)).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 677–79.
305. Wisconsin essentially applied the same heightened standard of Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del.
2005). In Lassa, Wisconsin required the defamation plaintiff allege specific facts sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss, but because Wisconsin requires pleading defamation with particularity, it essentially
is the same standard as Delaware’s summary judgment motion. Lassa, 718 N.W.2d at 687.
306. Wisconsin ultimately decided that even under the heightened standard, the lower court did not err
by compelling disclosure. Lassa, 718 N.W.2d 686–88.
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anonymously associate will protect an anonymous blogger’s identity
with the judicial power of heightened scrutiny. 307
d. Non-fundamental Rights: Rational Review, State Law, and
the Safety Valve
When anonymous speech does not implicate one of the
fundamental rights articulated by the Supreme Court, the
constitutionally required balance of interests is satisfied by
procedural due process and rational basis review. So long as the
anonymous speaker has notice and an opportunity to argue against
disclosure, 308 a court need only ask whether it has a reasonable basis
to believe that compelled disclosure will further a legitimate claim of
defamation. 309 As commentator Michael Vogel points out, “relatively
mundane rules of civil procedure” 310 provide multiple opportunities
to adequately balance interests. 311 In essence, the First Amendment
leaves it up to the states to decide how to approach pre-action
discovery requests when a fundamental anonymity right is not at
stake.
This outcome may seem unsatisfying. Often when plaintiffs seek
the identity of online complainants, the speech at issue does not
implicate a fundamental right. 312 Existing procedural safeguards may
not prevent a corporate plaintiff from obtaining one’s identity, even
in cases where it seems likely the goal of the subpoena is merely to
307. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2822–27 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that an asapplied challenge to Washington’s disclosure law would be sustained in part because of its serious
infringement on the right to freely and privately associate).
308. See supra notes 267–70 and accompanying text.
309. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (implying that government action
burdening non-fundamental rights need only meet a lesser standard of being reasonably related to a
legitimate government purpose).
310. Vogel, supra note 48, at 841.
311. Id. Vogel suggests several procedural and technical requirements of civil procedure that
adequately balance interests including: complaint drafting, submitting an order to show cause, arguing at
a hearing for such an order, serving the subpoena to an entity that has the capability of revealing the
identity, and post-discovery remedies such as Rule 11 motions for sanctions based on false claims. Id.
312. Many cases reviewed for this Note do not implicate the fundamental right to anonymous political
speech or anonymous association. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001); Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009); In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
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reveal the speaker and subject her to some sort of corporate
backlash. 313 However, though the First Amendment might not
provide protection, states can and do broaden the right of anonymous
speech. Consider Dendrite, where arguably no fundamental
anonymous speech right was at stake. 314 There, an anonymous
Internet poster spoke critically about the inner-workings of a
corporation, not about politics. 315 There were no concerns regarding
the speakers’ right to freely associate. 316 The court nonetheless
applied heightened scrutiny. However, in doing so, it acknowledged
that “[p]recedent, text, structure, and history all compel the
conclusion that the New Jersey Constitution’s right of free speech is
broader than the right against governmental abridgement of speech
found in the First Amendment.” 317
Finally, “in peculiar circumstances” the First Amendment should
recognize an exception in much the same way that the Supreme Court
did in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 318—what Justice Scalia
refers to as the “safety valve.” 319 The Supreme Court has recognized
that, regardless of the speech at stake, when compelling disclosure
would likely result in actual threats of harm, strict scrutiny is
warranted. 320 Even otherwise legitimate disclosure requirements,
such as the campaign contribution limits of Buckley v. Valeo, require
this safety valve. A showing of a “reasonable probability that the
compelled disclosure would result in threats, harassment or reprisals
from either Government officials or private parties” would prevent
disclosure. 321

313. See supra note 140.
314. Dendrite, 775 A.2d 756.
315. Id. at 762–63.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 766 (quoting N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, Corp., 650 A.2d
757, 770 (N.J. 1994)).
318. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
319. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Patterson,
357 U.S. at 462–63.
321. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 72.
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Though historically limited to implications of associational rights,
this safety valve concept could provide the needed ad hoc challenge
to any disclosures that would likely result in “threats, harassment, or
reprisals.” 322 The safety valve approach could be similar to the
balancing test applied in Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe. 323
Whatever standards a court applies, there should also be such a safety
valve.
2. Applying Exacting Scrutiny: Is the Libel Case Sufficiently
Strong Enough?
Applying exacting scrutiny has two steps: determining whether the
government has a sufficiently important interest and analyzing
whether its actions are substantially related to such interest. 324
a. A Strong Libel Case Provides a Sufficiently Important
Government Interest
To overcome exacting scrutiny, a law must further a sufficiently
important government interest. 325 A strong libel case provides at least
such a governmental interest. Using a syllogism, commentator Elad

322. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 74). It would seem that legitimate defamation suits do
not constitute reprisals as the protection from defamation is a compelling government interest. See supra
notes 336–46 and accompanying text. Justice Alito explains how this safety valve could be applied in
the context of state disclosure laws of political referenda. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2822–27 (2010)
(Alito, J., concurring) (“[P]laintiffs have a strong case that they are entitled to as-applied relief.”).
Though in a different context and under a different name, Justice Powell suggested a similar safety valve
in Branzburg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). A four-justice plurality in
Branzburg rejected an absolute reporter’s privilege as applied to the compelled testimony of a reporter at
a grand jury. Id. at 707–08 (plurality opinion). The plurality found that the First Amendment is not
violated when the government compels a reporter’s testimony. Id. at 708–09. In Justice Powell’s
concurrence, he argued for a type of safety valve measure whereby a reporter who shows that the
compelled testimony is meant to harass him can invoke a constitutional balancing test. Id. at 710
(Powell, J., concurring). The balance is “between the freedom of the press and the obligation of all
citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of
adjudicating such questions.” Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Vogel, supra note 48, at 832–
36.
323. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); see also
supra notes 120–123 and accompanying text.
324. Supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text.
325. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010).
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Peled persuasively shows that states have not only an important, but
also a compelling interest in protecting the reputation of its citizens
from defamation. 326 First, the First Amendment requires a compelling
government interest before allowing a content-based restriction on
speech. 327 As another commentator has stated, “Content-based
restrictions . . . limit communication because of the message
conveyed.” 328 Thus, libel law, which by definition is a limitation on
speech based on its content, is a content-based restriction. 329 Finally,
because libel law is generally constitutional, 330 Peled reasons that
“[t]he assumption . . . should be that the need to protect reputation is
a compelling interest.” 331 She further highlights the “severe
individual and societal harms” resulting from defamation and argues
that the State has a compelling interest in preventing it. 332
The Court’s anonymous speech cases support this reasoning. In
Talley v. California, the Court hinted that laws compelling identity
disclosure, if limited to prevent “fraud, false advertising and libel,”333
may survive the scrutiny of the Court, suggesting that preventing
fraud, false advertising, and libel is at least an important government
interest. 334 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court
suggested there was at least a strong government interest in
protecting truth and reputation. 335 The Court acknowledged that the
“state interest in preventing fraud and libel . . . carries special weight
during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may
have serious adverse consequences for the public at large.” 336
In a defamation action seeking to disclose an anonymous speaker’s
identity, the sufficiently important government interest is the
326. Elad Peled, Constitutionalizing Mandatory Retraction in Defamation Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 33, 64–64 (2007).
327. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 106 (1991).
328. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM & MARY L. REV. 189,
190 (1983).
329. Peled, supra note 336, at 64–65.
330. Id. at 64.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Talley v. California 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
334. Id.; see also Vogel, supra note 48, at 827.
335. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 349–50 (1995).
336. Id.
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protection of reputation through a libel suit. 337 Therefore, a court
should scrutinize the suit itself to determine whether the defamation
plaintiff has a sufficiently strong case. The Delaware Supreme Court
has already developed a standard that plaintiffs must meet to survive
this level of scrutiny. 338 In Doe v. Cahill, the court subjected a
defamation plaintiff to the heightened scrutiny of the summary
judgment standard. It found that doing so “will more appropriately
protect against the chilling effect on anonymous First Amendment
Internet speech that can arise when plaintiffs bring trivial defamation
lawsuits primarily to harass or to unmask their critics.” 339 Thus, if a
court finds a fundamental right at stake, it should require a potential
defamation plaintiff to exhibit a strong case, that is, one in which she
presents evidence sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion
on all elements of her claim within her control. 340
b. Substantially Related to the Sufficiently Important
Government Interest
The second prong of the exacting scrutiny standard requires
government action to be substantially related to furthering its
sufficiently important interest. 341 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
suggested that broad laws of prior restraint will not satisfy this
standard; 342 a more narrowly tailored approach might. In its recent
anonymous speech cases discussed in Part II above, the Court was
uncomfortable with a laws’ sweeping nature yet “recognized the
propriety of limitations that are closely targeted toward
wrongdoers.” 343 In both McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission and
Talley v. California, the Supreme Court “left open the question
337. See supra notes 335–46 and accompanying text.
338. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
339. Id. at 459.
340. See id. at 464. The Cahill court was “mindful that . . . [w]ithout discovery of the defendant’s
identity, satisfying th[e] element [of actual malice] may be difficult if not impossible.” Id. It thus held
that “a public figure defamation plaintiff must only plead and prove facts with regard to elements of the
claim that are within his control.” Id.
341. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010).
342. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166–67
(2002); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960); Vogel, supra note 48, at 824–31.
343. Vogel, supra note 48, at 827.
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whether a narrowly tailored law, aimed at preventing fraud and
deception, might survive a First Amendment challenge.” 344 In Talley,
the Court invalidated a law purportedly geared towards preventing
“fraud, false advertising, or libel” 345 but that was not so limited. The
Court there explicitly did “not pass on the validity of an ordinance
limited to prevent these or any other supposed evils.” 346 As
Commentator Michael Vogel points out, this implies “that an
ordinance targeted at identifying such wrongdoers after the fact could
survive First Amendment scrutiny.” 347
Similarly, the Court, in McIntyre, “recognize[d] that a State’s
enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification
requirement.” 348 In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York
v. Village of Stratton, the Court repeated its concern over the
“breadth of speech affected” 349 by a disclosure law purportedly
aimed at preventing fraud or preserving the integrity of the ballotinitiative process. 350 The Court found that the law “sweeps more
broadly, covering unpopular causes unrelated to commercial
transactions or to any special interest in protecting the electoral
process.” 351
In contrast, a pre-action motion to compel the identity of specific
individuals who have allegedly defamed someone is far narrower in
scope and thus substantially related to the government’s end-goal.352
It applies to one individual or set of individuals based on a specific
event. 353 Furthermore, courts often ensure its decision is as narrow as
possible by requiring “that the information sought is material and
necessary to the actionable wrong.” 354 For example, in Dendrite

344. Karl, supra note 211, at 529.
345. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
346. Id.
347. Vogel, supra note 48, at 827.
348. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 353 (1995).
349. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164 (2002).
350. Id. at 167.
351. Id.
352. See Vogel, supra note 48 at 837.
353. Id. at 837–38.
354. Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting
Uddin v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 810 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)).
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International, Inc. v. Doe, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered
the “necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s
identity” 355 as a factor in its balancing test. Similarly, in In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., a Virginia court
required a plaintiff to show that “the subpoenaed identity information
is centrally needed to advance that claim” before it enforced the
subpoena. 356 This is the type of tailoring that is required if a court is
to apply exacting scrutiny in a pre-action disclosure defamation suit.
CONCLUSION
There is little consensus across jurisdictions on how to balance the
interests of defamation plaintiffs with those of anonymous
bloggers. 357 Courts are currently employing varying tools to ensure
that the First Amendment’s protection of anonymous speech is not
unnecessarily trammeled, while furthering the compelling
government interest of protecting citizens’ reputations. 358 All courts
require that the anonymous speaker be given notice of her potential
loss of anonymity and an opportunity to argue against it. 359 Few
courts, however, agree on how compelling a case a putative plaintiff
must have before stripping a speaker of her anonymity. 360
Some courts, like the New York court in Cohen v. Google, rely
solely on existing state discovery laws coupled with the extensively
developed defamation jurisprudence. 361 Others, such as America
Online, leave the decision up to the discretion of the judge to
determine whether the plaintiff’s defamation claim is offered in good

355. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
356. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d
377 (Va. 2001).
357. See supra Part I.
358. Id.
359. See supra Part I.A.
360. See supra Parts I.B and I.C.
361. Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
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faith. 362 An increasing number of courts are requiring the plaintiff to
produce actual evidence on every element of her cause of action
within her control. 363 There is both great uncertainty and a rush to
develop new rules. 364
As commentator Michael Vogel argues, new rules may not be
necessary. 365 Old rules, however, such as the well-developed law of
due process should not be ignored. Courts invariably invoke
procedural due process when requiring that anonymous bloggers
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard. 366 They should further
rely on substantive due process when considering whether to compel
disclosure in a potential defamation suit.
In four of its anonymous speech cases, the Supreme Court
articulated the fundamental rights warranting heightened scrutiny
including the right to anonymously speak on political issues and the
right to anonymously associate. 367 In Doe v. Reed, the Court clarified
that, as applied to a disclosure law burdening a fundamental speech
right, the level of scrutiny is exacting. 368
When fundamental rights are implicated, courts should not merely
rely on generally applicable pre-action disclosure rules. Rather,
courts should apply exacting scrutiny by requiring plaintiffs to lay out
a sufficiently important case of defamation. Interestingly, courts are
already doing this by requiring that a defamation plaintiff show
enough evidence to survive a summary judgment. 369 This
requirement, however, should be limited to instances when a
fundamental right is at stake. In other cases, courts should rely on
their generally applicable pre-action disclosure procedures. Finally,
even if a fundamental speech right is not implicated, if revealing a

362. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377
(Va. 2001).
363. See supra Part I.B.2.
364. See supra Parts I.B–I.C.
365. Vogel, supra note 48, at 855.
366. Supra Part I.A.
367. Supra Part II.A.
368. Supra Part II.B.
369. Supra Part III.
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speaker’s identity is likely to result in harm, courts can invoke a
safety valve and prevent disclosure.
The New York court that barely batted an eye as it compelled the
disclosure of the blogger of “Skanks of NYC” had it right. 370 This
blog was a far cry from the anonymous Federalist Papers, and no
fundamental right was at stake. 371 The speech was clearly not
political, and the blogger was not anonymously associating.372
Liskula Cohen needed to show only a reasonable basis for the court
to find she had a legitimate defamation suit. 373 Cohen thus succeeded
and discovered that Rosemary Port, an acquaintance of hers from the
fashion world, was the anonymous blogger. Cohen forgave Port and
dropped her legal pursuit. 374 The First Amendment had better things
to do.

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
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